War, industrial mobilisation and society in Northern Ireland, 1939-1945 by Ollerenshaw, Philip
War, Industrial Mobilisation
and Society in Northern
Ireland, 1939–1945
P H I L I P O L L E R E N S H AW
Abstract
Archive-based regional studies can contribute much that is new to the economic, political and
social history of the SecondWorldWar. This paper considers the process of industrial mobilisation
in Northern Ireland, a politically divided region which was part of the United Kingdom but
which had its own government. It examines the changing administrative framework of war
production, the debate on military and industrial conscription, the role of women and the
economic implications of geographical remoteness from London. The paper adds to our limited
knowledge of regional mobilisation and contributes to a neglected aspect of the history of Northern
Ireland.
In the analysis of war economies in Europe between 1939 and 1945 the question
of industrial mobilisation is fundamental, but remains imperfectly understood.
Governments in belligerent countries created frameworks within which industry
and labour were encouraged and coerced to maximise output in ways which were
modified according to resource availability, changing war plans and the fortunes of
military campaigns, including territorial conquest and occupation. As Mark Harrison
has recently suggested, prewar mobilisation of the Axis powers was based on the
expectation of rapid victories, that of the Soviet Union was designed to defend
itself against attack from the west, while the rapid mobilisation of the western Allies
took place only when they regarded war as certain. The United Kingdom, the
School of History, University of the West of England, Oldbury Court Road, Bristol, BS16 2JP;
Philip.Ollerenshaw@uwe.ac.uk. The valuable advice and constructive criticism of Kent Fedorowich,
Peter Howlett, Keith Jeffery, Penny Summerfield and the journal’s two referees are gratefully
acknowledged. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Annual Conference of the Economic
and Business Historical Society in Los Angeles in April 2004, and the School of History seminar at the
University of Leeds in May 2004. I am grateful to the participants in the discussions on those occasions
and to the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast, for
access to material.
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United States and the Soviet Union ‘mobilized their economies knowing that only
quantitative effort could neutralize the qualitative advantage of the Axis powers’ and
that during the conflict, the key was ‘not so much to have detailed economic controls
as to be able to maintain economic integration under intense stress’.1
For the belligerent powers this last point implies a need to understand the process
of mobilisation in different regions and also how regions were integrated into national
war economies. Much of the work on industrial mobilisation, however, concentrates
on outcomes and on national aggregates, paying much less attention to regions and
to the process of production in a wider social and political context.
The literature on the war itself is still dominated by the official histories, which,
although they contain vast amounts of detail not readily available elsewhere, have
disappointed many economic historians by the questions they do not satisfactorily
address. Among the most important of these are the problems of resource allocation
and the means by which, and the extent to which, these were resolved.2 For the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the official History of the
Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series was published in more than fifty
volumes from 1949 onwards. Unfortunately, very few if any of the volumes take an
explicitly UK-wide view and they are dominated by the view from London, making
the series title essentially a misnomer.
The aim of much of the economic history of the war has been to move beyond
the official histories and to ask new questions, especially in a comparative context.
Thirty years ago Alan Milward declared himself ‘infuriated’ by those works of military
history ‘in which armies and navies come and go, commanded by greater or lesser
figures deciding momentous historical issues’ but which said nothing ‘of the real
productive forces which alone give such events meaning or, indeed, make them
possible’.3 His War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945 was a bold and highly successful
work of comparative economic history based largely on published sources. Since
then other work, by Richard Overy, Mark Harrison and Talbot Imlay, for example,
has pursued both national and comparative themes and added a great deal to our
knowledge of the war.4 In the United Kingdom some of the most impressive work
has focused on women workers, but as Peter Howlett and David Edgerton have
emphasised, the business history of the war, including the role of businessmen in
1 Mark Harrison, ‘The Economics of World War II: An Overview’, in Mark Harrison, ed., The Economics
of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 23–4.
2 Peter Howlett, ‘New Light through Old Windows: A New Perspective on the British Economy in the
Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 28, 3 (1993), 361; the most recent essay on Britain
is idem, ‘The War Economy, 1939–45’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, eds., The Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume III, Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–26.
3 Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939–45 (London: Allen Lane, 1977), xii.
4 See especially Richard Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), and idem, Why the Allies Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); Harrison, Economics of World
War II; Talbot Imlay, Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics and Economics in Britain and France,
1938–1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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government, remains seriously under-researched and there are very few studies of the
regional experience of mobilisation.5 Imlay’s recent comparative study of Britain and
France between 1938 and 1940, influenced by the work of Jay Winter and Jean-Louis
Robert on the First World War, has argued for an approach which incorporates
strategic, domestic–political and political–economic dimensions. Such an approach
is most appropriate for work at the level of nation states. Regional studies, while not
neglecting the strategic context, have to take the national and international strategy
as given, but they can focus more on Imlay’s second and third areas, integrating
economic, social and political history in order to address themes which do not
figure largely in the official histories. These include the problems faced by firms
in wartime expansion, the impact of mobilisation on men and women workers,
migration, political consensus and dissent, and the extent to which distance from
London affected the rate of mobilisation.
In the United Kingdom, alongside the enormous growth in central government,
organisation of the war effort had a strong regional element from early in 1940. This
article adds to our knowledge of the process of mobilisation by drawing heavily on
new archival evidence to examine the relationships between government, industrial
mobilisation and society in one region of the United Kingdom – Northern Ireland –
between 1939 and 1945, and sets the discussion in a wider British context. It considers
the changing administrative framework of war production, the political debate over
military and industrial conscription, and why industrial mobilisation was relatively
slow and unemployment relatively high. For Northern Ireland this article takes the
discussion well beyond the official history of the region6 and confirms the value of
a broad approach to wartime regional history. It concludes that because the history
of Northern Ireland differed so markedly from Britain we should be careful before
making UK-wide generalisations about wartime experience.
Regional organisation and the debate on military conscription
In the Second World War both the administrative machinery and the military
technology were far more complex than they had been in the First. The technical,
strategic and economic synthesis was therefore much more difficult to achieve at
national level, and this made an effective system of regional economic organisation
5 On women workers see Penny Summerfield, Women Workers during the Second World War (London:
Croom Helm, 1982), and Mari A. Williams, A Forgotten Army: Female Munitions Workers of South Wales,
1939–45 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002). The neglect of business history is emphasised in
David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
63–5, 145–6, and Peter Howlett, ‘“The Thin End of the Wedge”?: Nationalisation and Industrial
Structure During the Second World War’, in Robert Millward and John Singleton, eds., The Political
Economy of Nationalisation in Britain, 1920–50 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). A rare
essay on regional wartime history is David Thoms, War, Industry and Society: the West Midlands, 1939–45
(London: Routledge, 1989).
6 The government of Northern Ireland sponsored an official history of the region, since it was concerned
that the British government’s official history might leave the wartime role of Northern Ireland
‘discredited or belittled’. See Brian Barton, foreword to J. W. Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second
World War (Belfast: HMSO, 1956, repr. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), xiii.
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all the more essential. The diversity of productive potential of different regions was
so great that central government had to devolve some responsibility down to the
regions.7 Indeed, the issue of regional versus centralised control in war production
was a ‘most difficult and bitterly contested’ one, according to Harold Macmillan
who, as chairman of the Industrial Capacity Committee, was closely involved in all
the debates in 1940 and 1941.8 Regional organisations offered a more appropriate
framework for settling local rivalries between the service departments and provided a
valuable forum where representatives of employers, trade unions and the production
ministries might meet on a regular basis. Given the experience of the First World War,
the need to establish a framework which minimised inter-departmental rivalry was
paramount.9 Northern Ireland was one of twelve area boards established in January
1940 to provide the national framework for regional organisation.10 From July 1940
the boards were collectively responsible to the newly established Industrial Capacity
Committee and through that to the Production Council. Among their key functions
were to co-ordinate the production of essential stores, to facilitate the exchange of
information between relevant ministries, service departments and the area advisory
committees; to address difficulties in increasing output; to convey proposals for the
expansion of industrial capacity in the area; and to inform London of any problems
with priority of contracts. To assist with these tasks the boards were permitted to set
up advisory panels on an industrial or geographical basis.11
With so much at stake and with so many conflicting interests involved it was only
to be expected that the system would experience substantial evolution, especially after
the formation of the Churchill government in May 1940. In May 1941 area boards
were replaced by the Production Executive’s regional boards, now responsible directly
to the Production Executive, established in January 1941 and chaired by Ernest Bevin
as minister of labour and national service. Much to the regret of some regional board
members who sought more executive authority, Bevin saw their functions as largely
advisory, suggesting that it was ‘difficult, even dangerous, to think too much in terms
of the devolution of power’.12 In Northern Ireland the evolution of the role, personnel
and functions of regional organisation had to take account of the existence of devolved
government in the region which had operated since the partition of Ireland in 1921,
with a prime minister and cabinet of ministers based in Belfast. The latter included a
ministry of commerce, which had no direct equivalent at Westminster, and a ministry
of labour. Neither Viscount Craigavon, prime minister until November 1940, nor his
successor between then and April 1943, John Andrews, proved to be capable leaders
7 Harold Macmillan, The Work of the Area Boards, Jan. 1941, Ministry of Commerce Records, Public
Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast (hereafter PRONI), COM 28/2.
8 Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939–45 (London: Macmillan, 1967), 118.
9 Financial News, 2 June 1939, PRONI COM 61/57.
10 J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes, Administration of War Production (London: HMSO, 1955), 419.
11 Production Executive, Constitution and Functions of Regional Boards, May 1941, PRONI COM
61/460.
12 Production Executive, Note of a Meeting of Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen and Secretaries of the
Regional Boards, 14 May 1941, ibid.
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of wartime mobilisation. Only from April 1943, when the minister of commerce and
production, Sir Basil Brooke, became premier, did Northern Ireland have a prime
minister who demonstrated effectiveness in the organisation of war production.13
Northern Ireland was a traditional industrial region, dependent to a considerable
extent on textiles (where most of the workforce were women), shipbuilding and
engineering, centred on Belfast. The region suffered substantial structural and cyclical
unemployment in the interwar period, and by July 1938 unemployment stood at
29.1 per cent of the insured industrial labour force, the highest figure since the
creation of Northern Ireland in 1921,14 while per capita incomes were about 55 per
cent of the British level.15 A population of about 1.4 million contained just under
350,000 insured workers at the start of the war, and in the transition from peace
to war the contrast with Britain could hardly have been greater: in August 1939
unemployment as a percentage of the insured labour force in Britain was 8.3 per
cent, declining to 5.2 per cent in November 1940. The corresponding figures for
Northern Ireland were 19.5 per cent and 21.7 per cent.16 The largest manufacturing
industry, linen, was more dependent on raw material from Europe than almost any
other UK industry, and the loss of supplies of flax from the Baltic states and the Low
Countries contributed to the serious unemployment position. In spring 1941 very
few linen companies were working at more than 60 per cent capacity and in July
unemployment in the industry reached 37.1 per cent.17 Unemployment remained
well above the British average throughout the war, and, although it fell steeply from
spring 1941, reaching its lowest point in autumn 1944, the regional economy never
sustained ‘full’ employment.
Unlike many of the depressed regions in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland
had not been designated a Special Area, a label regarded as a stigma by some in
the ruling Unionist Party, since it would have been an admission of failure by
a party which had used the industrial success of the region as a key reason for
partition of the country in 1920–1.18 It was also a politically divided society, with
about two-thirds of the population voting unionist and a third nationalist. Among
the latter, support for the war could not be taken for granted, and active, even
13 The evolution of regional administration is well covered by Blake, Northern Ireland, 369–83, and Brian
Barton, Brookeborough: The Making of a Prime Minister (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1988), ch. 9.
14 Ministry of Labour, Unemployment Insurance Acts – Estimated Number of Persons Insured, February
1943, PRONI CAB 4A/89. After partition the Northern Ireland ministry of labour assumed
responsibility for collecting data from 1 Jan. 1922.
15 K. S. Isles and N. Cuthbert, An Economic Survey of Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 1957), 11.
16 War Cabinet Man-Power Requirements Committee, Northern Ireland’s Manpower Resources, A
Note by the Joint Secretary (J. Harold Wilson), 2 Jan. 1941, PRONI COM 61/440 (hereafter Wilson
Report).
17 Harry Mulholland, Chairman of York Street Flax Spinning Company to Sir Walter Smiles, 11 April
1941, PRONI COM 28/6; ‘Unemployment in the Linen Industry’, July 1941, PRONI COM 61/370;
Isles and Cuthbert, Economic Survey, 566, 576; Joel Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (London:
HMSO and Longman, 1953), 152.
18 For a denial that Northern Ireland was a ‘distressed area’ see the speech by Captain Hugh Dixon,
government chief whip, to the Ulster Unionist Labour Association on 3 April 1939, in Belfast News-
Letter, 4 April 1939.
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violent, opposition from republicans was always possible. The growing political
consensus about the war which Imlay has identified for Britain did not apply in
Northern Ireland.19 Belfast was the largest city, the centre of government, industry
and finance, the major port and principal location of electrical power generation –
an unusually high degree of economic integration which brought benefits in
peacetime but correspondingly serious risks of disruption from bombardment in
wartime. During the war the region differed from Britain in three related respects: it
had no military conscription, no compulsory general registration of labour and no
policy of concentrating industry to make maximum use of labour and factory space.
In the absence of military conscription, close attention was paid to the rate of
voluntary recruitment to the British army. This was in fact disappointing, declining
from 2,500 per month at the start of the war to just 600 by December 1940, leading
to some nationalist mockery of unionist claims of loyalty to Britain.20 More generally,
the absence of conscription meant that the political and economic context of the
debates about mobilisation was very different from that in Britain. It was also the
main reason why unemployment during the war was much greater, but dilution of
skilled labour and the role of women in traditionally ‘male’ employment was much
less than in Britain. The relatively high levels of unemployment marked this region
out as the least mobilised of any in the United Kingdom throughout the conflict.
As late as September 1942, Northern Ireland still had a ‘practically unlimited’ supply
of unskilled employees, and the availability of labour in general was greatest in this
region, followed by the northern region of England, Scotland, parts of east London
and the south east region respectively. In terms of areas to which industrial production
might be directed, Northern Ireland, where ‘all services were satisfactory’ was seen to
be the most favourable, followed by east and south London. Scotland and the northern
region of England were next, except for production which required rail transport
from the congested Midlands or the south of England, and in both Scotland and
the northern region factory premises were in short supply and the electricity supply
difficult. Within the United Kingdom overall, the north-west of England and the
Midlands were the most comprehensively overloaded in terms of the government’s
criteria of factory premises, labour, electricity, gas, accommodation for billeting,
transport and coal, while Northern Ireland was the least so.21
There were two main arguments used against the imposition of conscription.
First and most significant was the well-founded fear of political and social disorder
organised by various groups, sometimes with the support of the Catholic Church.
Towards the end of the First World War, the mere threat of military conscription in
Ireland had been enough greatly to increase clerical and republican hostility to Britain
and had contributed substantially to Sinn Fe´in’s landslide general election victory in
19 Imlay, Facing the Second World War, esp. ch. 6.
20 Irish News, 17 April 1943. See also Keith Jeffery, ‘The British Army and Ireland Since 1922’, in Thomas
Bartlett and Keith Jeffery, eds., A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 438.
21 Control of Factory and Storage Premises, Location of New Production (3rd edn), 30 Sept. 1942,
PRONI COM 61/660.
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1918.22 The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which had embarked on a widespread
bombing campaign in Britain in the early 1920s, returned before the outbreak of
war to undertake active and geographically widespread operations which continued
well into 1940 in both Northern Ireland and Britain. The most serious incident, in
August 1939, was a bomb in Coventry which killed five people, leading to anti-Irish
feeling and walk-outs by workers in this industrially most important city; five IRA
members were put on trial for murder and two were hanged. Action by the IRA
‘expeditionary force’ resulted not only in a strengthening of security measures but
also to extensive deportations of suspects from Britain to Eire, which in turn led
to more bombings.23 In Northern Ireland early wartime targets included cinemas
showing British newsreels of the war, as well as civilian musicians entertaining the
troops. The 1939–40 IRA campaign was greatest in Derry and Belfast and led to
large-scale internment.24 Republicans also ran a radio station from west Belfast, set
fire to gas masks and were alleged to have helped Germany by not always complying
with blackout orders.25
How much disorder would be generated by conscription was impossible to judge,
but Basil Brooke, who had been placed in charge of recruiting in the summer of
1940, expected it to range from ‘passive resistance to actual rioting’.26 Brooke had an
early warning about this on a recruiting campaign visit to the city of Derry in August
1940, when the unanimous view of the lord lieutenant and his deputies was that
conscription should definitely not be applied to Northern Ireland and that ‘Derry
would go up in flames if it was’.27 In 1941, among those groups organising opposition
was the Ulster Gaelic League, which also wanted all British soldiers to leave Northern
Ireland.28 The leader of the Catholic Church in Ireland, Cardinal Joseph MacRory,
himself from Ballygawley, close to the border in the northern county of Tyrone, had
consistently opposed British policy in Ireland, especially partition. Early in the war a
German representative in Dublin even speculated that MacRory might be prepared
to consider German intervention to end partition.29 His opposition to conscription
22 Thomas Hennessey, Dividing Ireland: World War I and Partition (London: Routledge, 1998), 220–8.
23 The Times, 29 Aug. 1939; Irish News, 5 Aug. 1939; Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London:
Collins, 1954), 243–4. There were also attacks on Irish prisoners by other inmates at Dartmoor prison:
Irish News, 29 Aug. 1939. The great political significance of the executions on 7 February at Winson
Green Prison, Birmingham, is clear from a letter from the British prime minister Neville Chamberlain
to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Feb. 1940, in Neville Chamberlain, The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, ed.
Robert Self, Vol. 4, The Downing Street Years, 1934–40 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 497. I thank Glyn
Stone for this reference. On the IRA campaign of the early 1920s see Peter Hart, The IRA at War,
1916–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 6.
24 See, for example, Londonderry Sentinel, 2 and 9 Jan., 24 and 29 Feb., 25 May, 1 June, 20 July and
3 Sept. 1940.
25 Marianne Elliott, Catholics in Ulster (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 403.
26 Diary of Sir Basil Brooke, entry for 24 May 1941, PRONI D/3004/D/32.
27 Ibid., entry for 12 Aug. 1940, PRONI D/3004/D/31. For more detail on this debate see especially
Barton, Brookeborough, ch. 8.
28 Londonderry Sentinel, 27 May 1941.
29 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 267;
Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921–1994: Political Forces and Social
Classes (London: Serif, 1995), 242.
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was absolute. In a letter to the Irish bishops in May 1939 and in a radio broadcast
of May 1941 MacRory argued that partition had deprived northern Catholics of
‘their fundamental rights as citizens in their own land. In such circumstances, to
compel them to fight for their oppressor would be likely to arouse indignation
and resistance’.30 When Churchill decided that conscription would not go ahead, a
relieved Brooke confided in his diary that it was ‘probably a wise decision’.31 Later
in the war Brooke, now prime minister, continued in public to support military
conscription, but ‘loyally accepted’ the British government’s view.32
A second argument against conscription related to the labour market. The
introduction of conscription in Northern Ireland would lead to an unwelcome cross-
border influx of workers from neutral Eire and this would not only cause immediate
resentment among conscripts and their relatives, but it would probably continue to
create political and social problems after the war had finished, since it would not be
easy to force people to return to Eire.33 Cross-border migration was made as difficult
as possible, not only to deter ‘the surreptitious entry of dangerous persons’,34 most
notably IRA members, but because of the political imperative to prevent Eire citizens
from taking scarce jobs in the north. The minister of home affairs introduced the use
of permits for anyone not normally resident in Northern Ireland and thereby included
not only those from Eire but also those migrants from Britain who had slipped into
the region to avoid conscription. The scheme was introduced on 1 January 1943 but
made retrospective in application to 1 January 1940.35
Problems of regional mobilisation
The rearmament programme begun in 1935 had brought only limited benefits to
Northern Ireland compared with many other British regions. Inability to bring more
employment to the region gave rise to increasingly serious criticism, not least from the
government’s own supporters in the Orange Order and the Ulster Unionist Labour
Association.36 Unlike Britain, Northern Ireland had not benefited from a factory
construction programme, nor was there evidence of systematic planning to disperse
productive capacity to minimise the effects of concentrated enemy bombing. In 1939
and 1940 there had been a migration of firms from some of the most vulnerable
areas such as London, the south-east and the Midlands, but none of these had
30 BBC Monitoring Service, extracts from a broadcast by Cardinal MacRory from Athlone in Irish
Gaelic and English, 22 May 1941, PRONI CAB 9 CD/207/1.
31 Diary of Sir Basil Brooke, entry for 27 May 1941, PRONI D/3004/D/32.
32 Irish News, 15 May 1943.
33 Cabinet Conclusions, 21 May 1941, PRONI CAB 4/475/17. After the war the continuing
employment of residence permit holders from Eire did cause a reaction in some areas: Ministry
of Labour to the Manager, Londonderry Labour Exchange, 14 Jan. 1947, PRONI LAB 5/59.
34 Memorandum Submitted by the Minister of Home Affairs in Regard to Border Control, 24 April
1942, PRONI CAB 4/507/4.
35 Memorandum by the Minister of Home Affairs in regard to the Infiltration of Eire Workers into
Northern Ireland, 16 March 1942, PRONI CAB 4/503/2. In just over three weeks, 10,000 applications
for residence permits had been received: Belfast News-Letter, 25 Jan. 1943.
36 Belfast News-Letter, 30 Nov. 1938, 4 April 1939.
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come to Northern Ireland. A further difficulty was the rapid turnover of British
ministers and the disruption of negotiations with Westminster for contracts that this
caused.37 Moreover, rearmament in many British industrial regions such as the west
Midlands from 1935 raised the consciousness of managers and workers of the growing
probability of conflict and instilled a sense of urgency about production rarely found
in Northern Ireland.38 Prewar rearmament in Britain also caused labour shortages
and the poaching of skilled labour, both of which were exceptional in Northern
Ireland before 1941, when their incidence became quite suddenly a serious cause for
concern and governments and managers were reminded just how few skilled workers
needed to leave a firm in order to disrupt production.39 So few war contracts had
been awarded to firms in the region by the end of the first full year of war that a batch
of propaganda posters sent from England exhorting men and women to work harder,
and for longer hours, and including the slogan ‘Go to it’, were an embarrassment
both to employers and to the Belfast government, who asked for them not to be
displayed on the grounds that there was very little for the workers to go to.40 All
of this reinforced the markedly negative effect on morale caused by unemployment.
These observations do not, however, mean that all opportunities for orders were
taken. Several months into the war there was still evidence of apathy and a reluctance
of firms in Northern Ireland to undertake work even for such a leading British
armaments contractor as Metropolitan Vickers. The consequence was that the work
went to firms in Lancashire and Yorkshire instead, much to the disappointment of
the area board which had brought Vickers’ representatives over to Belfast in the first
place.41
Two major contributory factors to the slow rate of mobilisation in the later
1930s and early 1940s were the failure to secure the building of one or more Royal
Ordnance Factories (ROFs) and the very small number of Admiralty orders for
Harland & Wolff shipbuilders. The construction of new ROFs in Britain was one
of the most remarkable features of the rearmament period and the first two years
of war. By December 1939 ten had been built, employing some 54,000 workers,
and another nineteen were planned. Just over two years later, forty ROFs would
employ 312,000 workers. In employment terms this equated to ‘the creation of a
major new industrial sector’.42 Persistent lobbying had brought ROFs to depressed
areas such as south Wales in the later 1930s, and the local impact on employment
could be profound. By 1943 the ROFs at Bridgend and Glascoed employed 50,000
37 For a specific example see letter from Sir William Allen MP in Portadown News, 2 Nov. 1940.
38 Thoms, War, Industry and Society, ch. 1. An excellent case study of the implications of conversion to
war production in Coventry is A. Shenfield and P. Sargant Florence, ‘Labour for the War Industries:
the Experience of Coventry’, Review of Economic Studies, 12, 1 (1943–5), 31–49.
39 J. H. Guthrie of the Ministry of Supply to W. D. Scott of the Ministry of Commerce, 1 July 1941;
J. F. Gordon, Minister of Labour, to R. T. Luney of the AEU 31 July 1941, PRONI COM 61/599.
40 Wilson Report, para. 7(c).
41 Meetings of the Area Board for Northern Ireland, 30 April, 10 May, 22 May 1940, PRONI CAB
3A/8.
42 William Hornby, Factories and Plant (London: HMSO, 1958), 91.
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workers, 70 per cent of whom were women.43 Despite many efforts, no ROF was
built in Northern Ireland and this represented perhaps the most significant single
disappointment of the period 1935–45. In a written Commons answer in July 1940,
Macmillan simply declared that the disadvantages of establishing an ROF in Northern
Ireland outweighed the advantages, and declined to give details which ‘might assist
the enemy’,44 but cancellation came after a national review of the factory-building
programme and a recognition that the programme was both far too ambitious and
unnecessary.45
How much the IRA campaign in both Britain and Northern Ireland adversely
affected the latter’s bid to get an ROF is debatable, although it must have been a factor,
as it was in some other decisions about whether to expand munitions production
in the region. For example, in March 1940 when the Belfast branch of one of
the United Kingdom’s largest engineering companies, the Leeds-based Fairbairn,
Lawson, Combe Barbour Ltd, was asked to take on substantial shell production, the
Director of Ammunition Production became concerned at ‘the possibility of IRA
interference’. The local MP, Edmund Warnock, reassured him that ‘in selecting the
premises, care was taken to choose a building in a safe area. This building is in the
heart of an intensely loyal district which is free from political or sectarian disturbance’.
Further, another Belfast engineering company, James Mackie & Sons, which was then
already engaged in a range of armaments production, was located in a much more
‘difficult’ area in west Belfast, but there had ‘never been hint or suggestion of IRA
disturbance there’.46
With regard to shipbuilding, prewar unemployment was higher than in other large
UK centres of the industry, and at the end of 1937 Harland & Wolff were not even
on the official Admiralty List of contractors for destroyers and submarines. Even so,
the chairman of the firm cautioned against political pressure on the Admiralty for
further contracts, since it would not change government programmes but would cause
friction with other shipbuilding firms.47 Only two navy vessels were on the stocks in
1938, and builders on the Clyde, the Tyne and the Mersey and at Barrow-in-Furness
were all much more successful in securing contracts.48 This may well have been due to
more competitive tendering from other areas, and there is a suspicion that Harland &
Wolff may have priced themselves out of the running for contracts.49 At about the
same time two of Belfast’s largest engineering companies, which could work to
capacity on their normal commercial business, showed little initial enthusiasm for
extending their productive capacity, even with the offer of War Office subsidies to
43 Williams, Forgotten Army, 52, 58. See also David Edgerton, ‘Public Ownership and the British Arms
Industry, 1920–50’ in Millward and Singleton, Political Economy of Nationalisation, 164–5, 181.
44 Hansard (Commons), 1939–40, 362, Col. 1022, 4 July 1940.
45 E. A. G. Robinson, ‘The Overall Allocation of Resources’, in D. N. Chester, ed., Lessons of the British
War Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 42–3.
46 Edmund Warnock, MP, Proposed Shell Factory in Belfast, 17 March 1940, PRONI COM 61/175.
47 Notes of a conversation between F. E. Rebbeck of Harland & Wolff and the Minister of Finance,
8 Dec. 1937, PRONI FIN/30/AC/8,
48 Memorandum on Rearmament, March 1938, ibid.
49 Sir Samuel Hoare to J. M. Andrews, 31 Oct. 1938, ibid.
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do so, to meet any future ‘war emergencies’.50 In Northern Ireland, as in Britain,
it was not easy to persuade firms to switch to munitions work from their normal
commercial business, especially when the latter seemed both secure and profitable.
The prospect of disruption, the expense of expanding capacity and lack of guarantees
of further orders rarely appealed to firms’ short-term financial horizons.51
In explaining the slow rate of mobilisation, detailed analysis of Northern Ireland
early in the war took the form of a report undertaken for the war cabinet at the
end of 1940 by Harold Wilson, then a young economist employed by the cabinet
secretariat in London. After fifteen months of war, Northern Ireland’s contribution
to the war effort had been negligible, even in shipbuilding and engineering, despite
the fact that it had suffered less from enemy action than any other part of the
United Kingdom, which made it the most attractive location for the development
of munitions production. The contrast with industrial regions in Britain was stark:
Wilson pointed out that in Northern Ireland ‘since the outbreak of war the siren
has sounded only five times. The loss of production associated in Great Britain with
enemy air raids – that which is due to loss of time during alerts, to inability to
work night shifts, to absenteeism, to dislocation of electricity, water and transport
services – to nervous and physical exhaustion, is unknown in Northern Ireland’.52
Moreover, at that stage, the Irish Sea remained an almost completely safe waterway.
If such characteristics strengthened Northern Ireland’s case for more contracts, the
absence of air attack early in the war, together with the physical distance of the region
from Dunkirk may have both contributed to a psychological detachment which was
conducive to a lack of urgency in the war effort. As Sir Walter Smiles, chairman of
the Northern Ireland area board, told Harold Macmillan in April 1941, ‘in this little
corner of the British Empire we hardly yet realise that the nation is engaged in a life
and death struggle’.53
Until the unexpectedly rapid fall of France in 1940 it had been widely assumed
that the region was not vulnerable to air attack. Then there were two major air
strikes on Belfast, on the nights of 15/16 April and 4/5 May 1941. The first of
these may have killed up to a thousand people, perhaps the greatest number in a
single night in any UK city outside London during the war. Altogether during the
Belfast blitz, 56,622 houses in mainly working class areas were hit, 3,200 of which
were demolished and another 3,952 ‘badly damaged’.54 Poor air defences and civil
defence planning were coupled with a sense of near-panic at cabinet meetings, at
50 Inter-Departmental Committee on Unemployment, Second Interim Report, 1 Nov. 1937, ibid.
51 On the British experience see Peggy Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries (London: HMSO, 1957),
25.
52 Wilson Report, para. 7(a).
53 Sir Walter Smiles to Harold Macmillan, 15 April 1941, PRONI COM 28/7. For evidence of worker
apathy and time wasting, and of poor management in wartime factories, see Robert Fisk, In Time of
War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939–45 (London: Paladin Books, 1985), 463–6.
54 Over two years later almost £2 million had been spent by Belfast Corporation and £700,000 by
private owners in repairing the damage to housing stock: Irish News, 15 Sept. 1943. The best general
account of the air raids is Brian Barton, The Blitz: Belfast in the War Years (Belfast: Ulster Historical
Foundation, 1989).
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which it was very clear that the government was simply unprepared for the damage
that heavy bombing might inflict on industrial capacity, workers’ housing, civilian
morale, power supplies or indeed the ability of government to function at all. Only
after these raids did ministers begin to give serious thought to dispersal of production
and of government departments.55 Nor was there any immediate solution for the
short-term refugee crisis caused by the lack of accommodation for the very large
numbers forced to leave Belfast. After the May raid 20,000 people were sleeping out
at night, including some families with up to nine children.56
Further evidence on the barriers to industrial mobilisation can be drawn from
Harold Macmillan’s visit to the region as part of his UK-wide tour of area boards
in spring 1941, itself prompted by criticism of the slow rate of increase in war
production. In his visits to different areas Macmillan sought as wide a range of views
as possible from groups of trade unionists, representatives from chambers of commerce
and engineering and other employers, as well as the area board, on how output might
be increased. The main complaints from trade unionists were that, unlike in Britain
where trade unionists (i.e. Bevin) had been brought into government at cabinet level,
this had not happened in Northern Ireland, nor did the region have a labour supply
inspectorate to promote efficient use of the workforce. One of the major engineering
employers pointed to the lack of expert officers in the ministry of supply who could
evaluate production possibilities of firms outside the shipbuilding and engineering
sectors. For Macmillan the prerequisites for more rapid mobilisation in the region
were the improvement in the quality of labour through upgrading, training and
dilution, and better subcontracting, so as to utilise machine tools more intensively.
No opposition to the principle of dilution was found and Macmillan recognised
that the lack of government contracts could always be used by unions, especially the
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), as a reason not to accept dilution. He also
stressed to Bevin the need for a labour supply officer to regulate the skilled labour
employed by individual firms and a welfare officer to ensure appropriate working
conditions.57
A major part of the problem for Northern Ireland was constitutional and
administrative, especially the way in which powers were divided between Belfast
and London under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish
Treaty of 1921. While the Northern Ireland government was responsible for labour
in the region, decisions about munitions production were made in London. At the
end of 1940 Northern Ireland was not represented on the Production Council, the
Labour Supply Board, the Economic Policy Committee or the Industrial Capacity
Committee.58 The lack of integration into British policy-making materially weakened
55 Memorandum by the Minister of Public Security, 12 May 1941, PRONI CAB 4/473/10.
56 Londonderry Sentinel, 15 May 1941.
57 Harold Macmillan to Ernest Bevin, 6 May 1941, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Macmillan Papers, Dep.
268.
58 The nature of the committee structure for economic administration between 1939 and 1942 is
explained in J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes, Administration of War Production (London: HMSO and
Longman, 1955), ch. 19.
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the Northern Ireland government’s ability to lobby effectively on behalf of industry,
and also limited Westminster’s appreciation of Northern Ireland’s industrial potential.
Ernest Bevin, moreover, made it very clear that neither he, nor the production
ministers, had direct responsibility for the region.59 In addition to these obstacles,
geography also played a role in government policy, since the ‘driving force of
the production departments’ in London declined with distance and was ‘practically
nil’ by the time it reached Northern Ireland.60 Although Scotland was much more
integrated than Northern Ireland into the British state, it seems clear that geographical
remoteness from London also resulted in disadvantage both before and during the
war.61 It has been suggested that Whitehall did not always give parity of treatment
to Scottish interests, that in the early stages of the war English interests did much to
prevent a large-scale dispersal of factories to less vulnerable Scotland, and that English
firms had considerable success in arguing that where ‘non-essential’ production was
continued, this should be in England rather than Scotland. In Scotland, especially in
the first half of the war, this became a political issue not only because of the relatively
small number of ‘new’ industries compared with England, and the fear that after
the war the industrial structure would continue to be outdated, but also because of
the need for migrants to leave to work in England.62 In key aspects of economic
administration, there was no ‘United’ Kingdom during the war.
Politicians such as Sir Basil Brooke, minister of commerce from 1941, were
consistent in their view that war contracts should be awarded to the region rather
than men and women being sent to Britain to work. His view was repeated on
many occasions by Unionist MPs at Westminster. Brooke supported those trade
unionists who resisted dilution of skilled labour on the grounds that in the absence of
conscription it was unnecessary until substantial war contracts had been received.63
The issue of dilution of skilled labour was much more controversial in Northern
Ireland during the war than it was in Britain. National agreements were signed in
August and September 1939 between the Engineering Employers’ Federation and
the AEU relating to dilution, and another in May 1940 on the employment of
women in engineering.64 But the ‘nation’ in these cases was Great Britain, and not
the United Kingdom, so that the agreements did not apply in Northern Ireland;
this meant that dilution proceeded much more slowly in those engineering shops
59 War Cabinet Production Executive, Resources of Northern Ireland: a Note by Ernest Bevin, 4 April
1941, PRONI COM 61/460.
60 Wilson Report, para. 14.
61 R. H. Campbell, ‘The Scottish Office and the Special Areas in the 1930s’, Historical Journal, 22,
3 (1979), 167–83; idem, ‘The Committee of Ex-Secretaries of State for Scotland and Industrial Policy,
1941–45’, Scottish Industrial History, 2, 2 and 3 (1979), 1–10.
62 Richard Saville, ‘The Industrial Background to the Post-war Scottish Economy’, in Richard Saville,
ed., The Economic Development of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1985), 27–8; Bruce
Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland (London: Batsford, 1977), 232–4.
63 See, for example, War Cabinet Production Executive, Note by Sir Basil Brooke, Minister of Commerce
for Northern Ireland, 8 April 1941, PRONI COM 61/460; Training of Women for War Work –
Note by the Minister of Commerce, 7 Oct. 1941, PRONI COM 61/649.
64 The agreements are reprinted in Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries, 439–42.
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where the AEU was strongly represented. The union argued that as long as there
was unemployment among skilled men, and given the absence of conscription in
Northern Ireland, there was no need for dilution. With a few exceptions, such as
centre-lathe turners and electricians, there was little evidence of a shortage of skilled
labour in Northern Ireland for over a year into the war, but after that the issue became
increasingly pressing and occupied a considerable amount of time at the meetings of
the Production Executive. The difference from parts of industrial England was well
illustrated in spring 1941, when the area board in Belfast heard that ‘in engineering
shops in Manchester one turner is looking after six machines worked by women,
while here [in Belfast] each machine was worked by a qualified turner’.65 Similarly,
while in Britain women in shipbuilding accounted for 9 per cent of the workforce
by 1943,66 the figure in Belfast was less than 2 per cent (see Table 1). Moreover, single
shift working remained much more typical for much longer in Northern Ireland than
was the case in Britain.
Business and labour relations
In analysing wartime industrial mobilisation it is necessary to consider not only
the experience of large firms, atypical but always the most visible to governments
and to historians, but also the extent to which small and medium-sized firms were
brought into the war effort. This section provides new evidence on the difficulties
of mobilisation of both small and large firms during the war, drawing examples
from textiles, shipbuilding and aircraft production. In the politically sensitive and
jealous world of war contracts, mobilisation of heavy industry needed people with
big-business experience who were ‘above party’ to act as a link between private
industry and government. How this was achieved remains a seriously neglected
aspect of the war economy. In Northern Ireland Brooke made two key appointments
shortly after becoming minister of commerce. First, John Guthrie, who came out of
retirement from his post as senior overseas engineer with the British multinational
company Babcock and Wilcox, was appointed to serve as an area officer to liaise
between engineering firms and the production departments of the ministry of
supply, a post calling for ‘energy, tact and resource’.67 Second, in July 1941, with
the approval of Beaverbrook and Sir Charles Craven (the British government’s chief
industrial adviser), Brooke appointed Ernest Cooper, a director of Gillette Industries
in England, to work with the production committee of the ministry of commerce.
His initial brief was to analyse the reasons for the slow rate of industrial mobilisation
in the region.68
Northern Ireland was predominantly a region of small and medium-sized
enterprises – precisely the kind that often lost out in rearmament and wartime
65 Meeting of the Area Board for Northern Ireland, 9 April 1941, PRONI CAB 3A/8.
66 Summerfield, Women Workers, Appendix B, 199.
67 W. D. Scott to Sir John Greenly, Chairman of Babcock and Wilcox, 7 April 1941, PRONI COM
60/B/2/23.
68 Diary of Sir Basil Brooke, entry for 22 July 1941, PRONI D/3004/D/32.
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Table 1. Estimate of numbers engaged in war work in Northern Ireland, June 1943
Male Female Total Source
Agriculture (food, flax, timber, seeds, etc.) n/a n/a 156,000 (b)
Bauxite mining and processing n/a n/a 1,000 (a)
Shipbuilding and ship repairing 18,029 254 18,283 (c)
Engineering, motor vehicle and aircraft 39,312 9,234 48,546 (c)
Iron, brass etc. founding, heating and
ventilating apparatus
352 6 358 (c)
Motor repair garages 673 66 739 (c)
Bolts, nuts, screws, tools, cutlery, etc. 751 99 850 (c)
Railway etc. carriages, public service vehicles 807 7 814 (c)
Scientific instruments, watches, clocks, etc. 112 19 131 (c)
Explosives, chemicals, soap, paints, etc. 412 160 572 (c)
Linen manufacture n/a n/a 30,000 (a)+
Ropes, nets and other textiles n/a n/a 3,000 (a)
Making up government clothing,
parachutes, dinghies etc.
n/a n/a 9,724 (d)
Food canning n/a n/a 1,100 (b)
Construction of aerodromes, etc. n/a n/a 9,000 (a)
Total 280,117
Notes: Data include office staff and supervisory staff, but exclude other administrative staff, those in H. M.
forces, civil defence, the merchant navy, central and local government, transport and other public utilities and
distributive trades in Northern Ireland, and those Northern Ireland residents engaged in war work in Great
Britain (c. 25–30,000) and on the manufacture of civilian clothing (11,217).
Data sources for individual rows: (a) Estimates by Ministry of Labour for Northern Ireland, (a)+ provisional
estimate; (b) Estimates by Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Agriculture, (c) Ministry of Labour ‘L’ returns
for employment as at June 1943 (excluding firms employing less than six workers); (d) Ministry of Commerce
for Northern Ireland.
Source: Ministry of Labour for Northern Ireland, ‘Approximate Number of Persons Engaged on War Work’,
July 1943, PRONI COM 61/958.
contracts. This had also been a feature of the First World War.69 Complaints from
chambers of commerce, the main institutional voice of these firms, illustrate well
their frustrations and underemployment in provincial towns almost two years into
the war.70 A useful illustration of the difficulties of mobilising small firms is the
important shirt industry in the north-west of the region, centred on Derry city. As
a leading UK centre for this industry, the Derry region had more than thirty firms
with considerable potential to produce clothing for the armed forces. Before the
war most of these firms employed fewer than ninety workers, and it was difficult for
them to tender for contracts.71 A trade association helped some of them to connect to
69 ‘Ministry of Supply and Ireland’ (no date but c. December 1918), Ministry of Munitions Records,
National Archives, Kew, NAS MUN 4/6724.
70 Meeting of Harold Macmillan and Allan Young with Representatives of Chambers of Commerce of
Northern Ireland, 24 April 1941, PRONI COM 28/7.
71 H. C. Gordon of the War Office (Contracts Department) to W. D. Scott, no date but c. 23 May 1938,
PRONI COM 62/1/707.
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government, but not all were members, nor was it easy for firms to agree a common
price. Even had a common price been agreed, if it were too high then no firm would
be awarded a contract, leaving the industry, and the region, in a worse position
than before. In any case, with much excess capacity, government orders tended to
go to the lowest bidder, which, given the cost of freight from distant Northern
Ireland, was a real barrier to Ulster firms, the majority of tenders submitted from
this region being rejected because they were too high. A further drawback for many
small firms throughout the United Kingdom was their slender financial resources
which meant that they could not withstand the delays in payment which usually
accompanied government contracts. The minister of supply in Britain ‘simply could
not be bothered’ to deal with small firms which needed immediate payment, and
government was much more disposed to deal with larger, stronger, firms, especially
those with factories in Britain which tended to be better known to the authorities in
London.72 These considerations help to explain why, in the immediate prewar period
and in the very early stages of the conflict, small firms in Northern Ireland could be
at a serious disadvantage, although the extent of this disadvantage declined as demand
for military clothing eliminated excess capacity and both price and distance became
less important as determinants of success in securing government contracts. By spring
1941 the industry was working ‘almost to capacity’.73
In August 1940 there were only five firms on direct government contracts and, even
though this number had more than doubled by the end of the year, the total remained
very small.74 While the business history of the war ‘remains under a shroud’,75 evidence
on different firms can exemplify the problems in expanding output. What this
shows is that even large firms on direct contracts faced very substantial obstacles
to expanding production, and that the process was never smooth. Labour immobility,
skills shortages, trade disputes, production bottlenecks, managerial shortcomings,
dispersal of production, endless changes to specifications and erratic ordering by
government all contributed to this. Similarly, once the peak of the war effort was
past, firms typically faced cuts in government contracts which could be immediate
and severe, leading to disruption in production schedules and uncertainties which
made management extremely difficult.
Harland & Wolff was easily the largest manufacturing enterprise in Northern
Ireland and one of the largest shipyards in the world, doubling its wartime labour
force to reach 30,000 in 1945, by which time it had expanded into armaments
and tank production. It exercised a powerful impact on manufacturing in industrial
Belfast, and as a bastion of the skilled male Protestant working class had an unmatched
political influence. For the regional economy, one of the most important difficulties
at Harland & Wolff was its poorly developed connections to sub-contractors, leading
72 Joseph Welch to W. D. Scott, 12 Sept. 1940, ibid.
73 Minute of 29 March 1941, ibid.
74 Meeting of the Area Board for Northern Ireland, 28 Aug. 1940, PRONI CAB 3A/89; War Work in
Northern Ireland – Past and Future: A Note by the Ministry of Commerce, 21 Dec. 1940, PRONI
COM 61/441, suggests that twelve or thirteen firms were by then on direct contracts.
75 Howlett, ‘“Thin End of the Wedge”?’, 248.
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to under-utilisation of capacity in small and medium sized firms which could have
contributed more to wartime production. Even before the First World War this firm
was highly unusual within UK shipbuilding because it manufactured for itself most of
the components which in British yards were typically supplied by subcontractors.76
For this reason, by the Second World War, the firm had long regarded itself as ‘an
isolated unit’77 and was not inclined to co-operate easily with government officials or
trade unions, nor did politicians show much enthusiasm for intervening in the firm’s
affairs. In any case the Admiralty had such well-developed links with the yard that it
was difficult for politicians to intervene.
By the end of 1940 Harland & Wolff was working 144 hours a week – twenty-
four hours every day except Sunday.78 From early on in the war, however, the firm
was heavily criticised – by the Admiralty for its inability to meet production targets
and for the quality of some of its work, and by the trade unions for the lack of
canteen and welfare facilities and poor transport to and from the Queen’s Island
yard, and for the fact that workers who were just a few minutes late for work were
locked out, leading to involuntary absenteeism and substantial loss of production for
a complete day.79 The yard was badly damaged during an air raid of early May 1941,
but the prospects for dispersal were limited. Any decision had to balance the reduced
production in the short term against the possible advantage of higher and more regular
output if the works could be dispersed to one or more safe sites. Dispersing formerly
integrated plants to a number of different locations also ran the risk of introducing
new diseconomies of scale.80 These considerations carried particular weight where,
as in the case of Harland & Wolff, production was already unsatisfactory.81 The
unco-operative nature of the management at Harland & Wolff with respect to such
important questions as night-shift working, joint production committees, canteens
and worker welfare still caused the minister of commerce serious concern two years
later because of the large size of the firm which had an adverse impact ‘on the
general drive for accelerated and expanded production’.82 Harland & Wolff’s practice
of locking out for the whole day workers who arrived slightly late was still evident
in the spring of 1943.83
In February 1943 a British government delegation learnt that that absenteeism in
the Belfast shipyards was twice as bad as the worst yard in Britain, and three times as
76 The Shipbuilder, 6 (1911), 6, cited in Philip Ollerenshaw, ‘Industry, 1820–1914’, in Liam Kennedy and
Philip Ollerenshaw, eds., An Economic History of Ulster, 1820–1939 (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1985), 93.
77 W. D. Scott to Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Brown, 31 May 1941, PRONI COM 61/541.
78 War Work in Northern Ireland – Past and Future: A Note by the Ministry of Commerce, 21 Dec.
1940, PRONI COM 61/441.
79 Meeting of Harold Macmillan with Trade Union Representatives, 24 April 1941, and with the
Engineering and Shipyard Employees’ Representatives, 25 April 1941, PRONI COM 28/7.
80 A. Shenfield and P. Sargant Florence, ‘The Economies and Diseconomies of Industrial Concentration:
the Wartime Experience of Coventry’, Review of Economic Studies, 12, 1 (1943–5), esp. 97.
81 Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Brown to W. D. Scott, 16 May 1941, PRONI COM 61/541.
82 Northern Ireland’s Industrial War Effort – A Note by Sir Basil Brooke, 19 April 1943, PRONI CAB
3A/8.
83 Northern Whig, 17 Feb. 1943, PRONI COM/61/915.
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bad as the best. While absenteeism in British shipyards was a punishable offence under
the Essential Work Order of March 1941 this did not at that time apply to shipyards
in Northern Ireland, where it was opposed by both employers and the AEU. When
the question of dilution was raised, it was shown that the ratio of skilled workmen to
dilutees was higher in Northern Ireland than in any other part of the United Kingdom
and this contributed to raising the cost of production.84 The resistance to dilution
varied between different groups of workers, but by late 1943 dilution had proceeded
far among welders and shipwrights, much less so among electricians and least of all
among plumbers where the union insisted that until all their unemployed members in
Eire had been taken on they would resist dilution. Moreover, the demand for skilled
labour from other large employers was now beginning seriously to compete with
the shipyard, something that had been almost unheard of. The managing director of
Harland & Wolff argued that, unless an immediate solution was found to the problem
of labour availability, construction and repair work must be lost to Belfast. Before the
end of 1943 the Admiralty would make further criticisms of the Belfast shipyard, this
time for failing to meeting deadlines for contracts, an especially serious issue before
the impending invasion of Europe in 1944.85
If Harland & Wolff faced particular problems and criticisms, so did the aircraft
manufacturers Short and Harland. This firm, established in Belfast in 1936 as part
of the strategy of developing productive capacity in relatively safe areas, was 60 per
cent owned by Short Brothers of Rochester in Kent and 40 per cent by Harland &
Wolff. It was a rare example of a ‘new’ industry in the region and was a product of
British government encouragement to large shipbuilders such as Harland & Wolff,
John Brown in Clydebank and Vickers at Barrow to join with aircraft manufacturers
to pool expertise and inject new capital.86 The history of this firm has attracted most
attention because of the design, managerial and production failures leading to the
nationalisation of the parent company Short Brothers in 1943, which helped to trigger
a major political debate in the United Kingdom on the government’s intentions
regarding the ownership of industry.87 The expansion of the firm in Northern Ireland,
where it employed some 15,200 workers by March 1942, was based mainly on the
problematic Stirling heavy bomber and the Sunderland flying boat, and clearly posed
serious challenges to the management.
After the May 1941 air raids, the firm opened eight dispersal factories in addition
to the main works, but Shorts faced a ‘point blank’ refusal by men to work night
shifts at the latter, and even a 59-hour week in day shifts, essential to reach the
production targets, could not be achieved. These hours compared very unfavourably
84 Ibid., 16 Feb. 1943.
85 Notes of a Meeting on Labour Problems at Harland & Wolff, 18 Dec. 1943, PRONI COM 61/266.
86 F. E. Rebbeck, Note on Short and Harland, 12 Feb. 1945, PRONI CAB 9F/164/1; Sebastian Ritchie,
Industry and Air Power: the Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 1997),
188.
87 Howlett, ‘“Thin End of the Wedge”?’; David Edgerton, ‘Technical Innovation, Industrial Capacity
and Efficiency: Public Ownership and the British Military Aircraft Industry, 1935–1948’, Business
History, 26, 2 (1984), 247–79.
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with large numbers of British firms engaged in aircraft production, where double-
shift working was typical and even three-shift working not unknown.88 The AEU,
which itself did not admit women members until 1943, opposed the introduction
of women workers at the main works and they comprised less than 5 per cent of
the workforce by March 1942. This figure was derisory compared with the dispersal
factories, some of which had more than 80 per cent women workers and where there
seems to have been no objection to day and night shift working. The opposition
encountered by the introduction of women workers at the main works was especially
resented by management, since the productivity of women at the dispersal factories
was acknowledged to be so much greater. In the general manager’s words, ‘much
more difficult work is being done in a shorter time, after a few months training, by
the girls in the various Dispersal Factories, than is being done by boys in their third
year and even by men’.89 Despite the various obstacles facing Short and Harland, it
has been argued that public ownership may have assisted the company by improving
communications with the parent company in England, and also improving labour
relations through the introduction of a joint production committee.90 Even so, until
the end of the war, strike action and managerial shortcomings continued to blight
production and led to real concerns for the Northern Ireland government about the
future viability of aircraft production in the region.91
The relatively slow rate of industrial mobilisation led to public criticism in both
Britain and Northern Ireland. In May 1941, Churchill privately expressed concern
at the ‘limited extent’ of the region’s ‘contribution to the nation’s industrial war
effort’.92 This contributed significantly to government unpopularity, reflected in
by-election defeats, and, ultimately, to the resignation of the prime minister, John
Andrews, in 1943. In the absence of military conscription and compulsory labour
registration the British press warmed to the theme of the unequal sacrifices of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. It also became much more intolerant of rising strike
activity, especially in 1942–3, when unemployment had begun to fall rapidly and
labour market conditions were more favourable for workers than at any previous
time in the history of Northern Ireland. According to one calculation, strikes
in war industries in the region had resulted in 3 million working hours lost in
the nine months to April 1943, a figure which constituted ‘a disgrace to Britain
and the Empire’.93 Although the density of union membership for both men and
88 J. S. Buchanan, Director General of Aircraft Production, to E. H. Cooper, 3 April 1942; W. H.
Denholm, Regional Technical Officer (Scotland) to E. H. Cooper, 9 April 1942, PRONI COM
61/762.
89 W. P. Kemp, Managing Director at Short & Harland, to Sir Basil Brooke, 31 March 1942, PRONI
COM/60/A/2/4. For an example of output and productivity of women at one dispersal factory see
Belfast Telegraph, 10 June 1942. The age range of the women was 15 to 56: Northern Whig, 19 May
1942.
90 Howlett, ‘“Thin End of the Wedge”?’, 247.
91 Note of the Prime Minister’s Meeting with Sir Frederick Heaton, April 1944, PRONI CAB 9F/164/1.
92 Herbert Morrison to J. M. Andrews, 13 May 1941, CAB 9/CD/208/1.
93 Sunday Pictorial, 4 April 1943, PRONI COM/915. Among several other critics was Jack Tanner,
National President of the AEU: Northern Whig, 5 March 1943.
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1939 64 28 36 0
1940 114 53 33 28
1941 242 164 25 53
1942 267 117 64 86
1943 315 151 54 110
1944 252 123 35 94
Source: Ministry of Labour for Northern Ireland, Statistics of Industrial Disputes, PRONI CAB 3A/89.
women in Northern Ireland was considerably lower than for the United Kingdom
as a whole, between 1938 and 1943 trade union membership in Northern Ireland
increased by some 57 per cent, and almost all of this increase was in unions based in
Britain.94 Table 2 provides data on the escalating number of disputes, while Table 3
contains the total number of strikes and working days lost by industry between
1941 and 1945. Recent research has concluded that in the absence of conscription
and the direction of labour, the system of wartime industrial relations in Northern
Ireland was even more of a voluntary one than that in Britain and that this
resulted in ‘a lack of discipline’ in the labour force.95 Despite the introduction of
compulsory industrial arbitration in 1940, the expansion of large scale production,
the inexperience of management in dealing with rapid unionisation, a resurgent
Belfast Shop Stewards’ Movement and greater power for organised labour than had
been experienced in a generation, all led to remarkable strike activity. From being
typically less strike-prone than Britain before 1939, Northern Ireland experienced
a disproportionately severe level of industrial unrest during the war, especially in
engineering and shipbuilding. Moreover, a textile strike in 1940 and the widespread
stoppage in shipbuilding, engineering and aircraft manufacture in 1944 which the
government thought had the potential to become a general strike, were among the
most serious disputes anywhere in the United Kingdom during the war. Despite
the absence of a coal industry, Northern Ireland, with 2.5 per cent of the insured UK
workforce, accounted for 10 per cent of the working days lost.96
Unofficial strikes caused by wage disputes, transport difficulties and other, often
quite minor, issues at the workplace, the optimum use of skilled and other labour
and the creation of a pool of skilled labour through extensive training were seen
94 Isles and Cuthbert, Economic Survey of Northern Ireland, 212. Boyd Black, ‘A Triumph of Voluntarism?
Industrial Relations and Strikes in Northern Ireland in World War Two’, Labour History Review, 70,
1 (2005), 8.
95 Black, ‘A Triumph of Voluntarism?’, 19.
96 Ibid., 11–12.
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Table 3. Industrial disputes and strikes in Northern Ireland, 1941–5, by industry
Disputes









Quarrying 83 56 27 905 7,976
Shipbuilding and
marine engineering
57 37 20 35,572 320,710
Other engineering 115 89 26 7,159 52,227
Textiles 60 43 17 663 4,414
Food and drink
manufacturing
147 132 15 449 1,507
Building 70 58 12 414 1,191
Transport: road 72 50 22 8,694 38,673
rail 5 5 – – –
shipping 5 5 – – –
docks 91 65 26 3,666 30,888
Local authorities 222 218 4 226 656
Others 381 273 108 34,855 419,507
Total 1,308 1,031 277 92,603 877,749
Source: Ulster Year Book (Belfast: HMSO, 1947), 168.
as the most important obstacles facing Northern Ireland’s industrial expansion.97 In
attempting to overcome the production problems it faced, the Northern Ireland
ministry of commerce sought assistance from government officials in Scotland, three
of whom, the regional technical officer and his deputy, and the labour supply officer,
visited shipbuilding, engineering and aircraft manufacturing plants in the region
early in 1942.98 The main solution was the appointment of a labour inspectorate
along the lines already established in Scotland. In Northern Ireland, they identified a
‘definite lack of co-operation and good-will, almost amounting to suspicion amongst
employers, management and employees’. Some of this was due to supervisors who,
while ‘capable in the technical sense’ lacked ‘the aptitude for handling man-power
efficiently’. In other cases ‘over-zealous’ trade union officials were to blame. With
regard to unofficial strikes, the Scottish experience had been that labour supply
officers were crucial in addressing issues which if left alone were likely to lead
to industrial dispute. While the appointment of labour supply officers made the
government of Northern Ireland much more interventionist, it is clear that both
employers and trade unions, who had criticised the government for not intervening
more often in labour supply, welcomed the move. There was also general agreement
that the Scottish model would suit conditions in Northern Ireland. Two labour supply
97 Report of the Visitation of Technical Representatives from the Ministry of Labour and National
Service (Scottish Region) to Northern Ireland, 13–24 Jan. 1942, CAB 9/CD/208/1.
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officers were appointed shortly thereafter, one on secondment from Harland & Wolff,
the other a senior official in the AEU, and both had a record of military service in the
First World War.99 In taking this step, the government was belatedly responding to
a need which had been obvious at least since Harold Macmillan’s visit to the region
a year before. While it might have been too late to make a major difference to the
settling of disputes it is possible that it prevented minor grievances from escalating
into strikes.
Women and labour migration
In arguing the case for more war contracts, the Belfast government always used the
high levels of unemployment in the region as evidence that labour was available.
However, the government did not possess data on potential labour supply, including
possible migration within the region, while the Westminster government was more
interested in the labour available for migration to Britain. With regard to the
movement of labour within Northern Ireland, there were a number of serious
constraints. The expansion of war industries and the establishment of dispersal
factories required more travel by tram, bus or train, and this was something
‘comparatively new to the bulk of Northern Ireland labour’.100 So strong was the
custom of walking a very short distance to work that some workers in Belfast were
reluctant to accept employment even a short tram-ride away. This may well have
been reinforced by sectarianism and a strong sense of territoriality in working-class
areas which would have increased the aversion to travel through areas perceived to
be hostile. Given that travel to dispersal factories might involve three hours’ travel a
day it is no surprise to find considerable opposition to the idea.101
The potential supply of women workers within Northern Ireland seems to have
been characterised by a very high degree of immobility. Important new evidence on
this can be found in local surveys undertaken in summer 1943, when unemployment
was approaching its wartime minimum. One of these was a special enquiry undertaken
by the ministry of labour of almost 3,000 unemployed women registered at Belfast
and seven provincial labour exchanges, comprising about 75 per cent of the registered
unemployed women in Northern Ireland. This survey is particularly useful in
identifying different reasons for the immobility of women and used four sub-
categories for the purpose. Women in the first category, numbering 121 or about
4 per cent, were described as ‘hard core’ and held to be unemployable under any
circumstances because of age or physical infirmity. The second group, numbering 324,
some 11 per cent of unemployed women, was more problematic, since it included
99 Report of the Visitation of Technical Representatives; Proposals for the Better Utilisation of Man-
Power and Plant for War Production – A Joint Recommendation by the Minister of Labour and the
Minister of Commerce and Production, 18 Feb. 1942; Munitions Labour Supply Inspectorate – Press
Release, 21 April 1942, ibid.
100 James Larrard, Deputy Regional Controller, Ministry of Aircraft Production, Confidential
Memorandum on Northern Ireland Labour as Affected by the Housing Problem, 19 May 1943,
PRONI COM 61/955.
101 Ibid.
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those who were theoretically employable but were either ‘approaching confinement’,
whose benefit had been stopped after refusal to accept employment or who had left
employment without reasonable cause. The ministry was afraid that if these women
were to be offered work they would effectively escape punishment and be able more
easily to leave lower paid, but still essential, employment, such as textiles, to work in
munitions.
By far the largest group were the 2,224 women, some 74 per cent of the total, who
could not be transferred from their own areas. Slightly over half of these were single
women with domestic responsibilities, while the remainder were married or widows
with dependent children. Parental objection to moving outside the area was cited
as an influence on single women as old as 30. This left a residual 318 women who
‘purport to be transferable’, but who, in the ministry’s view, would not actually accept
work outside the area if it was offered. All in all not more than around 110 women –
between 3 or 4 per cent of the total – were genuinely mobile. By summer 1943,
4,528 women from Northern Ireland had been placed in employment in Britain,
many with the help of British firms who sent representatives to the region. There
was general agreement that this had practically exhausted the supply of what the
Ministry of Labour termed ‘genuinely mobile women’. Women from country areas
of Northern Ireland were slightly less reluctant to move away than those from Belfast,
but, among the former, those who were mobile were more likely to go to Britain
than to Belfast, since British firms could often provide ‘greater amenities’.102
In an English context Summerfield has suggested that the extent of social mixing
in war factories was much less than the propaganda in the ‘people’s war’ portrayed,
and that employers often resisted the recruitment of women over 40.103 Evidence
from the Northern Ireland ministry of labour supports these arguments, and reveals
how both could militate strongly against mobility, even within an individual district.
In 1943 it was confirmed that some employers would reject applicants who were over
40 years old or because they came from ‘social classes lower than the majority of their
employees’. Moreover, religion in Northern Ireland, much more than in England,
was used as a reason for accepting or rejecting an application for work.104 For women
with children it might have been expected that provision of childcare facilities would
have increased the likelihood of entering the labour market, but in country areas,
much more than in Belfast, this may not always have been the case. A survey of
women aged between 18 and 34 in the Antrim Town area in 1943 confirmed ‘a
general prejudice in the rural districts against collective minding of children’ and that
even if a cre`che were available, children would have to be moved ‘in all weathers
and outside healthy bedtime hours’. So strong was the tie to the district that women
102 Ministry of Labour for Northern Ireland, Availability of Unemployed Women Registered at
Employment Exchanges, July/Aug. 1943, PRONI COM 61/958.
103 Summerfield, Women Workers, 57–60. Posters advertising for women from Northern Ireland to train
as war workers in Britain stressed that they would be wanted if they were between 18 and 25 years
old, not already directly employed on war work, or else unemployed: Northern Whig, 6 Oct. 1941.
104 Ministry of Labour for Northern Ireland, Availability of Unemployed Women Registered at
Employment Exchanges, July/Aug. 1943, PRONI COM 61/958.
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would rather forego unemployment benefit than take employment elsewhere, and
this survey doubted whether more than 0.5 per cent of unemployed women were
mobile.105 In such circumstances the logic of arguments for bringing work to the
workers became compelling.
During the war both Northern Ireland and Eire provided labour for Britain. Given
Eire’s neutral status the recruitment process had to take place relatively discreetly, but
it became urgent from 1941 as general labour shortages developed in the British
war economy and the supply of mobile workers declined steeply.106 Initially under
the auspices of firms with an established presence in Eire, such as ICI and Ford
Motors, control passed to official organisations such as ‘British Foundries’ and ‘British
Products’. Between 1942 and 1945, almost 40,000 workers, a third of them women,
were recruited from Eire by the ministry of supply (28,600), the ministry of aircraft
production (8,858) and the Admiralty (1,753).107 Most of the women who went
from Northern Ireland to Britain worked in ROFs or other large munitions factories
where both working conditions and welfare facilities were relatively good.108 Between
February 1940, when data were first collected, and March 1942, some 31,176 people
transferred to Britain from Northern Ireland. Of these, 28,002 were men, 25,292 of
them classed as unskilled; 3,174 were women, and of this total 2,850 were unskilled.109
Many of the hostels at ROFs were purpose-built for women, with canteen, dormitory
and welfare block, other hostels were operated by firms such as ICI, Vickers and
Imperial Tobacco, some for both men and women, but more usually for one or the
other.110 In still other cases, such as the Standish Small Arms Ammunition factory near
Wigan in Lancashire, an agency factory for components and shell filling operated by
ICI, which could not find local labour and applied urgently to the Northern Ireland
government for women workers in February 1942, it was stressed that ‘care would be
taken to ensure that they were given comfortable homes and their welfare properly
studied’.111
The increasing government demands for labour from Northern Ireland and from
Scotland led to political reactions in both those countries. In Scotland complaints
focused on the lack of government orders, underutilised resources and the fact that
the country seemed to be used mainly ‘to provide a supply of mobile girls for
105 Special Survey of Women Workers Between the Ages of 18 and 34 in the Area Round Antrim
Town, 5 July 1943, PRONI COM 61/958. This survey was the first to convince the government
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England’.112 In Northern Ireland, even more than Scotland, migration of labour
became a sensitive political issue. The main reason for this was that some migration
was perceived to be ‘forced’ when, under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, refusal
by men or single women to accept work in Britain was deemed to be unreasonable
and could lead to discontinuance of benefit for up to six weeks. In addition, given
the delicate sectarian balance of local populations and the potential for changes to
electoral demography that emigration might bring, much attention was focused on
the religious denomination of the emigrants. For many, the mere fact of emigration
was a result of the failure of the Belfast government to secure sufficient war work
for the province, and since unemployment was much higher among the Catholic
population it followed that they would provide a disproportionate number of those
forced to migrate. The championing of the integrity of the family, and of social
security, could therefore coincide with criticism of government economic policy.
Thus Jack Beattie, campaigning as the (ultimately successful) Northern Ireland Labour
Party candidate in the West Belfast by-election in January 1943, the first to be
influenced by the Beveridge Report published the previous month, declared that
he stood ‘for the maintenance of family life’, opposed the sending of men and
women across to Britain and demanded work in Northern Ireland for ‘husbands,
brothers, sons and daughters now forced to earn their bread among strangers’.113 At
the same time, nationalist critics made much of the fact that Protestants had greater
protection against forced migration since they were more likely to have ‘steady and
sheltered’ employment, in the police for example.114 During the war this issue served
to draw attention to the wider question of under-representation of Catholics in public
employment,115 which would become a central feature of the civil rights campaigns
of the 1960s.
The force of these arguments was greatest in polarised urban areas such as Derry,
the second largest city in Northern Ireland. Three years before the war the city’s
electoral boundaries had been altered by the Unionist government so as to deny
the nationalist majority control of the corporation.116 This high-profile case of
gerrymandering had done much to worsen already strained community relations.
However, the government also came in for criticism from Derry unionists. As
early as 1940, the City of Derry and Foyle Unionist Association accused Belfast
of not giving Derry its fair share of work, adding that there was ‘no employment
for men in the city’.117 During the war the mainstay of the local economy, shirt
112 Ministry of Production, Digest of Regional Controllers’ Replies to Questionnaire about Effect of
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manufacture, received large government contracts for the armed forces, but this had
largely benefited women.118 Hopes that the new US naval base established in 1941
would provide long-term work for men proved misplaced, since the Americans
provided most of their own labour. By late 1943 male unemployment accounted for
almost 80 per cent of the total in the city.119 Given this political and social background,
sending unemployed men from Derry to Britain was a gift to government critics.
A meeting of nationalists in the city in October 1943 saw it as ‘nothing less than
a prearranged plan, a form of economic conscription, to drive Catholic men and
boys out of their country’.120 At the same time Derry Board of Guardians heard an
allegation that of 5,000 people sent to Britain since the start of the war fewer than
fourteen were non-Catholics. Not only did the claims made by the dependents of
men sent to Britain pending remittances from them constitute a serious burden on
the rates, but the dependents also had ‘the stigma of getting outdoor relief even
though it was of a temporary nature’.121
Government, labour registration and the end of the war
In Britain the demand for labour had become so great by 1941 that the government
could no longer delay the introduction of a general survey of men and women
who might be available for work. At the same time, the government stepped up
its drive to concentrate industries with the aim of releasing labour for munitions
production.122 Neither of these measures applied to Northern Ireland, but in 1943
the Belfast government had finally to acknowledge that it had no precise idea how
much or what kind of labour was available – a major obstacle if the region were to
attract firms from Britain. It did admit that this lack of knowledge led to ‘the anomaly
of the poverty of labour in the midst of plenty’.123
The suggestion that a general compulsory registration scheme for labour might be
extended to Northern Ireland was made more than once. The response, however, had
to take into account potential levels of popular resistance unknown in Britain. In 1942
Basil Brooke’s judgement was that industrial conscription would probably generate
‘as much agitation and difficulty’ as the introduction of military conscription.124
In September the following year, Sir Charles Wickham, Inspector General of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, thought that the main line of opposition would be the
perception among the civilian population that compulsory registration would be
‘the thin end of the wedge to military conscription’. Particular opposition to the
118 Ibid., 11 and 13 April, 1940.
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compulsory registration of women would be faced in country districts and there
would be parental objection to children being sent away from their homes. The
opposition to compulsory registration of older women which had been seen in
England would be ‘even stronger’ in Northern Ireland.125 Wickham thought that if
the aim was to register 250,000 women, about a third would be Catholics influenced
by the attitude of their church; even if the church remained neutral, about 10 per
cent of Catholic women (some 8,300) might defy registration. In addition, as the
experience in Britain had shown, another 3 per cent (amounting to 5,000) Protestant
women might refuse to register on other grounds. The authorities therefore might
have to deal with 13,000 women defying the law. Since there was only one women’s
prison in Northern Ireland – in Armagh, with fifteen vacant places and a total capacity
of only 120 – this was indeed a formidable difficulty.126 In Belfast, cabinet ministers
disagreed about the wisdom of compulsory registration, and eventually opted for
a voluntary scheme for women. It was made clear to any woman who considered
registering under this scheme that if she declared her willingness to go anywhere in
Northern Ireland to work, assuming that suitable accommodation was available, she
should feel honour-bound to accept the work. The minister of labour, however, gave
an assurance that there would be no compulsion.127
The voluntary registration scheme was given a positive welcome in a way that a
compulsory scheme certainly would not. Margaret MacAlpine and Celia Prendergast,
respectively the chair and secretary of the Women’s War Effort Association, argued
that the minister of labour for Northern Ireland should not only call a conference of
women in order to examine ‘ways and means of meeting this increased demand on
woman power’, but should also declare support for ‘the principle of equal pay for equal
work’ in the region. Above all, government had to recognise its obligations towards
working women with domestic responsibilities: ‘In order to do both jobs successfully
and without impairing the health of the family, such amenities as nurseries, school
meals, canteens in industry, shopping and laundry facilities should be provided’.128
By this stage of the war nursery schools for the children of war workers had begun
to be provided. The first one opened in east Belfast in late spring 1943, but later
that year the government was actively lobbied by women factory workers for more
extensive provision.129 More generally the war did see greater awareness of personnel
management and of the need for better provision of welfare facilities at firm level.
The dominance of old firms, most of which were small or medium-sized, meant
that in contrast to Britain, where there were many more new factories and firms,
Northern Ireland had at the start of the war lagged seriously behind in the provision
of facilities for the workforce. Chief among these were canteen and welfare amenities,
which were improved during the war under pressure from the workforce and the
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government, both of which recognised their importance in attracting labour and
combating absenteeism. In 1939 only three firms employed a welfare supervisor and
only three had canteens; by 1945 the figures were thirty-seven and more than one
hundred respectively.130
In 1943, when industrial mobilisation in the region had only just become more
established, the national war effort began to level off and then decline. In Britain
cuts in government orders led to unemployment, which affected morale and led,
as did better news from the front, to a relaxation in the sense of urgency over war
production.131 In Northern Ireland government, firms and unions began to try to
envisage the postwar regional economy, although there was no unanimity about
prospects.132 More than in any other UK region, however, there was considerable
apprehension about the end of the conflict, reflected in the large trade union
deputations organised from 1944 to lobby government over unemployment. A
particular concern was the re-emergence of a male unemployment rate which was
very much higher than that for women, and a recognition that any new industries
attracted to the region would be likely to employ mainly women.133 Mindful of
the experience of the 1920s and 1930s, male trade unionists feared ‘a return to the
old position of women working and supporting their menfolk’.134 Although some
in government feared transitional problems following the ending of war contracts,
unemployment was predicted to be short-lived and local, and the main problem was
expected to be a labour shortage. In such circumstances, time-consuming schemes to
promote short-term employment might be counterproductive, impeding the ‘normal
expansion of trade or the carrying out of public works of permanent value’.135 In
fact, trade union fears were justified and unemployment, as in the war, continued
at a much higher level in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom
throughout the postwar decades. In that crucial respect, and in contrast to so much
of western Europe, there was no golden age for this regional economy, despite an
energetic regional policy pursued by the devolved government after 1945.136
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Conclusion
This article has argued that in explanations of regional industrial mobilisation
account has to be taken not merely of economic, but of geographical, political
and social factors. The politics of Northern Ireland and the fear of social disorder
were critical in the decisions not to introduce military conscription or general
compulsory registration of labour. The first decision was a key determinant of a
level of unemployment which was always much higher than the UK average, and this
in turn limited the extent of dilution and the role of women in traditionally ‘male’
employment. The second decision meant that the government did not undertake a
comprehensive register of available labour at any time during the war, but local surveys
pointed to some severe constraints in the supply and mobility of women workers.
For constitutional reasons Northern Ireland was not fully integrated into the British
political decision-making process, and this had adverse consequences for the award
of war contracts. The capability of managers was severely tested in those large firms
most affected by industrial expansion, with some very visible dilution in management,
especially where production had to be dispersed over several sites. These are important
areas for the economic, social and business historian. In some respects Northern
Ireland was unique, but we still know relatively little about the implications for
mobilisation of geographical distance from London and the experience of managers
and workers in most regions, as well as the administration of regional production.
This applies not only to regions first and most directly affected by war production
such as the west Midlands and north-west of England, but also to others such as the
south-west, where the impact was slower and less complete. Just as the great value
of the comparative work of historians such as Milward, Overy, Harrison and Imlay
requires no emphasis, so more research into the regions during the period 1939–
45 should enable us to move further from the fifty-year dominance of the official
histories, and greatly improve our understanding of that elusive concept, the war
economy.
